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Introduction 
 
 
The EU in the Middle East and North Africa 
Helpless Bystander Rather Than Effective Democracy Promoter or Stabilizing Force 
Muriel Asseburg 
In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced 
the so-called Arab Spring. The EU pledged to generously support transformation pro-
cesses initiated in the region with a “3 M” approach, which would combine monetary 
support, market access, and increased mobility, as well as through a reinvigorated 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Yet, Europeans have not lived up to these prom-
ises. Against the backdrop of the Middle East and North Africa descending into ever 
greater levels of chaos and violence, the EU and its member states have been largely 
reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impact-
ing – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Yet, in view of an increasingly reluc-
tant US government to provide regional stability, Europe has no choice but to address 
instability in its southern neighborhood. To be more effective actors, Europeans should 
revisit their priorities, underlying assumptions, policy frameworks, and instruments. 
 
The EU has had a positive, reinforcing 
influence where domestic processes have 
gone in the “right direction.” Tunisia is 
definitely the one example where the EU 
was able to support the institutional 
process, competitive elections, and civil 
society, and thus contribute to a political 
transition toward a more participatory, 
inclusive, and pluralist political system. 
At the same time, the EU has been in no 
position to lure elites in other Arab coun-
tries into processes aimed at more demo-
cratic and just orders, nor to prevent 
authoritarian restoration in Egypt. It was 
also not able to contribute to halting the 
deterioration of political power struggles 
into civil war and state failure in Syria and 
Libya, entailing millions of refugees and 
internally displaced people, and a strength-
ening of sectarian mobilization and radi-
calization across the region, epitomized in 
the so-called Islamic State phenomenon. 
Nor has it offered answers on how to con-
tain these civil wars and prevent them from 
destabilizing entire sub-regions or how to 
effectively address the refugee crisis in the 
Mediterranean. Last but not least, the EU 
has not had any tangible impact on the one 
conflict that it has prided itself on for having 
progressive positions for the last 35 years 
and in which it is heavily invested, i.e., the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, rather 
than proving themselves as effective democ-
racy promoters or a stabilizing force in the 
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southern Mediterranean, Europeans have 
been largely reduced to ad hoc partners 
in crisis interventions of multinational 
alliances and to shouldering parts of the 
humanitarian fallout of violence and war. 
Major flaws of European approaches 
Major flaws have hampered more effective 
EU policies in the region. First, Europeans 
have based their policies toward the region 
on misled assumptions about the transfor-
mation processes unfolding in Arab Spring 
countries. To name but one: In contrast to 
the post-1989 experience in Central Europe, 
transformations in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt 
have been anything but centrally crafted 
processes based on elite bargains regarding 
transition to democracies and market 
economies. Rather, the transformations 
have been the outcomes of intense bargain-
ing processes and power struggles among 
forces for which institutional reform and 
transitional justice have not been priorities, 
and which have been marred by identity 
politics, political and societal polarization, 
and political violence. That has robbed 
Europeans of central local partners for 
driving transformation forward. Those 
reform processes that have been initiated 
and largely geared from the top, i.e., by the 
monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, have 
seen much less bumpy trajectories. But the 
depth of change has been narrowly con-
stricted, and the processes underway there 
should not be mistaken as anything akin 
to democratization or even a substantial 
increase in meaningful participation or 
checks and balances. 
Second, the ENP as well as the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the Union 
for the Mediterranean have not only failed 
to achieve their objectives with regards 
to fostering inclusive growth and helping 
political transition, regional integration, 
the cooperative engagement in lighthouse 
projects, building bridges between the 
shores of the Mediterranean, etc., they have 
also failed to create frameworks that would 
provide identity, serve as a point of refer-
ence, or have geopolitical relevance. Not 
only did the grouping together of eastern 
and southern partner countries in the ENP 
framework not make any sense. Southern 
Mediterranean countries have also been 
characterized by their being part of several 
(shifting) regional security complexes, each 
with specific challenges and a specific set of 
regional and international actors interven-
ing, which have not been reflected by these 
frameworks. 
Third, European instruments have either 
been ill-conceived, not adequate for the 
challenges at hand, or suffered from a lack 
of consistency and backing from EU mem-
ber states. The revised ENP’s “more for more” 
approach, for example, promising more 
support to good performers, has failed to 
provide strong incentives that could have 
impacted on crucial domestic actors’ cost-
benefit analysis. That has especially been the 
case because, on the one hand, crisis-ridden 
and inward-looking EU member states have 
failed to back up the “3 M” approach with 
substance and, on the other, regional com-
petitors that favor authoritarian upgrading, 
such as the Arab Gulf states, have weighed 
in with much more financial clout. 
In view of increasing destabilization in 
the region, Europeans have at least tacitly 
endorsed authoritarian restoration in Egypt, 
a regional player considered “too big to 
fail.” They failed to come out in a strong 
and united fashion against the July 2013 
military coup and sent monitors to observe 
the 2014 Egyptian presidential elections – 
thus providing legitimacy to the process, 
even though it was obvious that no level 
playing field existed in view of the severe 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and 
a plethora of opposition activists, politi-
cians, journalists, and human rights groups. 
In doing so, the EU and its member states 
have undermined their own consistency 
and credibility. 
In addition, Europeans have failed to 
coax local decision-makers, even in Tunisia, 
into addressing the main factors behind the 
initial uprisings by making socio-economic 
reform – including tending to neglected pe-
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ripheries – much more of a priority than 
before. Last but not least, new instru-
ments such as the European Endowment 
for Democracy and the Civil Society Facility 
have not only been equipped with negligible 
funds and been confronted with difficult 
working conditions in some partner coun-
tries, they have also stuck to a line of main-
ly working with elitist, Western-oriented 
representatives of civil society, thus robbing 
themselves of a larger societal and political 
impact. 
Lack of a strong conflict component 
Crucially, the ENP has not offered any tools 
for dealing first with countries in which 
the central state and the formal transfor-
mation process hardly matter anymore, as 
armed non-state actors dominate the scene, 
and second with phenomena, in particular 
the region’s overlapping refugee crises, 
which cannot be attributed to a single 
country. Thus, the EU has not had a central 
role in mediation and diplomacy to mend 
local and regional conflicts. The notable 
exceptions have been the E3 (United King-
dom, France, and Germany)’s involvement 
in negotiations with Iran; an EU mediation 
between Tunisia’s political forces, second-
ary to the domestic Quartet’s role; and the 
failed, yet important attempts by the High 
Representative and her team to bridge the 
gaps between the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood 
after the July 2013 coup in Egypt. Rather, 
the abolition of the EU Special Representa-
tive for the Middle East Peace Process in 
early 2014 and the void with regards to the 
EU Special Representative for the Mediter-
ranean since May this year have seemed to 
signal the EU’s withdrawal of diplomatic 
attention from the region. 
The EU has also been absent in the more 
robust approaches to dealing with violent 
conflict and non-state actors. Military inter-
ventions or military support for specific 
forces in these conflicts have been mostly 
ad-hoc security fixes driven by the US or by 
individual EU member states rather than 
being a result of joint European strategizing 
and planning, which would have taken into 
account and addressed regional side effects. 
On top of it, it has become clear that the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) instruments cannot have a stabiliz-
ing effect in environments of severe con-
flict. The European Union Border Assistance 
Mission Rafah has been suspended since 
mid-2007, and it is very doubtful that it will 
receive a new mandate that would allow 
the Europeans to effectively contribute to 
ending the Gaza blockade – as proposed by 
an E3 initiative in the summer of 2014 – 
unless Europeans were to revive and assume 
a much more active role in negotiations 
about a durable ceasefire. EUBAM Libya also 
had to be put on hold this summer as the 
country descended once more into civil war. 
Indeed, the mission has not had a chance 
to have any tangible impact on border secu-
rity in a situation where the central state’s 
reach did not extend to all its borders and 
where no national security forces to speak 
off existed. 
Conclusions 
In the face of an ever more reluctant and 
intervention-averse US government, Euro-
peans will have to assume greater respon-
sibility for stabilization in their immediate 
neighborhood – not least because they are 
the ones directly affected by spillover effects 
of the region’s violent conflicts. This also 
means that Europeans do not have the 
choice to only back the “good performers,” 
as some observers have suggested. Although 
it is indeed important to help make success 
stories come true – and Europeans should 
therefore undertake an extra effort to sup-
port transition in Tunisia and inclusive 
reform processes in countries such as Mo-
rocco – they should not fall into the trap of 
wishful thinking again when assessing the 
processes at hand. In addition, support for 
transition and domestic reform in the coun-
tries where political elites are willing to 
cooperate with the EU will not be enough 
to stabilize the region. In order to have a 
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tangible positive impact, Europeans will 
have to revisit their priorities, address the 
underlying assumptions of their approach-
es, interlink Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and ENP instruments, and 
strengthen their diplomatic and conflict-
prevention capacities. More concretely, 
four issues need attention. 
First, policies should be based much 
more on a realistic assessment of EU inter-
ests, priorities, and potential influence 
than to date. In reality, even if the ENP 
framework is maintained for the time 
being, that would lead to a stronger dif-
ferentiation between clusters of countries 
in the southern Mediterranean that take 
into account the objectives of local political 
elites (as long as there is a central govern-
ment in control) with regard to reform and 
cooperation with the EU, regional security 
complexes – with Libya, Syria/Iraq, and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the epicenter 
of the most important ones as of today – 
and other third actors active in the coun-
tries or sub-regions who have to be factored 
in as adversaries or potential partners. The 
High Representative should have the lead 
in the coordination of the different policy 
fields (CFSP, trade, humanitarian aid, devel-
opment cooperation, migration, etc.) and 
align them strategically. 
Second, although the ENP objectives of 
fostering prosperity, stability, and democ-
racy remain valid, prosperity, democracy, 
and the guarantee of human rights can 
hardly be achieved in an environment that 
is dominated by violent conflict or (partial) 
state failure. That means that, for the time 
to come, stabilization will have to be at the 
top of the European agenda for the region – 
stabilization, of course, not to be confused 
with stasis and repression. This implies that 
the EU must urgently strengthen its con-
flict prevention, management, and resolu-
tion capabilities, including the instrument 
of civil and civil-military CSDP missions, so 
that they can also work in a rough environ-
ment. It also means that the prevention of 
spillover effects of violent conflict within the 
region and the strengthening of state insti-
tutions in transition or reform countries 
should be at the center of EU support, 
including support for structural reforms 
in administration, judiciary, and security 
sectors – where, and as long as, this is pos-
sible, without at the same time strengthen-
ing repressive capacities. 
Third, Special Representatives for the 
Middle East Peace Process and Syria should 
be appointed urgently, alongside the Spe-
cial Representative for Libya. At the same 
time, their mandates should be tailored so 
as to have much broader outreach in the 
region. They should be put in a position to 
offer mediation and good offices and get 
involved in informal talks with a broad 
range of civil societies, local actors, as well 
as involved third states. In this, they would 
definitely profit from a permanent presence 
on the ground and a lifting of the no-con-
tact policy toward important actors listed 
as terrorist groups, such as Hamas. 
Fourth, the strategic challenge of refu-
gees in Europe’s southern neighborhood 
and migration to Europe needs to be ad-
dressed much more systematically and 
progressively than it has been to date and 
should take into account refugee rights, 
burden-sharing (among EU member states 
and internationally), migrants’ potential 
contributions to development, as well as 
immigration needs (see SWP Comments 
36/2013). 
Last but not least, the intended review 
of the ENP should, in contrast to the 2011 
revision, start from the interests of the EU 
and its neighbors and identify strategic 
objectives and priorities rather than being 
a bureaucratic stock-taking exercise focused 
on the evaluation of ENP instruments. It 
should also not be the outcome of bureau-
cratic procedures but rather a political 
debate from the start that involves the High 
Representative, the relevant commission-
ers, and the member states. Only then can 
the political will needed to forcefully imple-
ment new approaches be achieved. 
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